\chapter{Wiener's cryptanalysis method \label{chap:wiener}} Wiener's attack was first published in 1989 as a result of cryptanalysis on the use of short RSA secret keys ~\cite{wiener}. It exploited the fact that it is possible to find the private key in \emph{polynomial time} using continued fractions expansions whenever a good estimate of the fraction $\frac{e}{N}$ is known. More specifically, given $d < \frac{1}{3} \sqrt[4]{N}$ one can efficiently recover $d$ only knowing $\angular{N, e}$. The scandalous implication behind Wiener's attack is that, even if there are situations where having a small private exponent may be particularly tempting with respect to performance (for example, a smart card communication with a computer), they represent a threat to the security of the cipher. Fortunately, ~\cite{wiener} \S 9 presents a couple of precautions that make a RSA key-pair immune to this attack, namely (i) making $e > \sqrt{N}$ and (ii) $gcd(p-1, q-1)$ large. \section{Background on Continued Fractions \label{sec:wiener:cf}} Let us call \emph{continued fraction} any expression of the form: %% why \cfrac sucks this much. |-------------------------| \begin{align*} a_0 + \frac{1}{a_1 + \frac{1}{a_2 + \frac{1}{a_3 + \frac{1}{a_4 + \ldots}}}} \end{align*} Consider now any \emph{finite continued fraction}, conveniently represented with the sequence $\angular{a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, \ \ldots, a_n}$. Any number $x \in \mathbb{Q}$ can be represented as a finite continued fraction, and for each $i < n$ there exists a fraction $\rfrac{h}{k}$ approximating $x$. By definition, each new approximation $$ \begin{bmatrix} h_i \\ k_i \end{bmatrix} = \angular{a_0, a_1, \ \ldots, a_i} $$ is recursively defined as: \begin{align} \label{eq:wiener:cf} \begin{cases} a_{-1} = 0 \\ a_i = h_i // k_i \\ \end{cases} \quad \begin{cases} h_{-2} = 0 \\ h_{-1} = 1 \\ h_i = a_i h_{i-1} + h_{i-2} \end{cases} \quad \begin{cases} k_{-2} = 1 \\ k_{-1} = 0 \\ k_i = a_i k_{i-1} + k_{i-2} \end{cases} \end{align} Among the prolific properties of such objects, Legendre in 1768 discovered that, if a continued fraction $f' = \frac{\theta'}{\kappa'}$ is an underestimate of another one $f = \frac{\theta}{\kappa}$, i.e. \begin{align} \abs{f - f'} = \delta \end{align} then for a $\delta$ sufficiently small, $f'$ is \emph{equal} to the $n$-th continued fraction expansion of $f$, for some $n \geq 0$ (\cite{smeets} \S 2). Formally, \begin{theorem*}[Legendre] If $f = \frac{\theta}{\kappa}$, $f' = \frac{\theta'}{\kappa'}$ and $\gcd(\theta, \kappa) = 1$, then \begin{align} \label{eq:wiener:cf_approx} \abs{f' - \frac{\theta}{\kappa}} < \delta = \frac{1}{2\kappa^2} \quad \text{ implies that } \quad \begin{bmatrix} \theta' \\ \kappa' \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \theta_n \\ \kappa_n \end{bmatrix}, \quad \text{ for some } n \geq 0 \end{align} \end{theorem*} Two centuries later, first Wiener \cite{wiener} and later Dan Boneh \cite{20years} leveraged this theorem in order to produce an algorithm able to recover $f$, having $f'$. The \emph{continued fraction algorithm} is the following: \begin{enumerate}[(i)] \setlength{\itemsep}{1pt} \setlength{\parskip}{0pt} \setlength{\parsep}{0pt} \item generate the next $a_i$ of the continued fraction expansion of $f'$; \item use ~\ref{eq:wiener:cf} to generate the next fraction $\rfrac{h_i}{k_i}$ equal to $\angular{a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_{i-1}, a_i}$ %% non e` proprio cosi` \item check whether $\rfrac{h_i}{k_i}$ is equal to $f$ \end{enumerate} \section{Continued Fraction Algorithm applied to RSA} As we saw in ~\ref{sec:preq:rsa}, by construction the two exponents are such that $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\varphi(N)}$. This implies that there exists a $k \in \naturalN \mid ed = k\varphi(N) + 1$. This can be formalized to be the same problem we formalized in ~\ref{eq:wiener:cf_approx}: \begin{align*} ed = k\varphi(N) + 1 \\ \abs{\frac{ed - k\eulerphi{N}}{d\eulerphi{N}}} = \frac{1}{d\eulerphi{N}} \\ \abs{\frac{e}{\eulerphi{N}} - \frac{k}{d}} = \frac{1}{d\eulerphi{N}} \\ \end{align*} Now we proceed by substituting $\eulerphi{N}$ with $N$, since for large $N$, one approximates the other. We consider also the difference of the two, limited by $\abs{\cancel{N} + p + q - 1 - \cancel{N}} < 3\sqrt{N}$. For the last step, remember that $k < d < \rfrac{1}{3}\sqrt[4]{N}$: \begin{align*} \abs{\frac{e}{N} - \frac{k}{d}} &= \abs{\frac{ed - kN}{Nd}} \\ &= \abs{\frac{\cancel{ed} -kN - \cancel{k\eulerphi{N}} + k\eulerphi{N}}{Nd}} \\ &= \abs{\frac{1-k(N-\eulerphi{N})}{Nd}} \\ &\leq \abs{\frac{3k\sqrt{N}}{Nd}} = \frac{3k}{d\sqrt{N}} < \frac{3(\rfrac{1}{3}\ \sqrt[4]{N})}{d\sqrt{N}} = \frac{1}{d\sqrt[4]{N}} < \frac{1}{2d^2} \end{align*} This demonstrates that the hypotesis of ~\ref{eq:wiener:cf_approx} is satisfied, and allows us to proceed with the continued fraction algorithm to converge to a solution ~\cite{20years}. \paragraph{} We start by generating the $\log N$ continued fraction expansions of $\frac{e}{N}$, and for each convergent $\frac{k}{d}$, %% XXX. verify this which by contruction is already at the lowest terms, we verify if it produces a factorization of $N$. First we check that $\eulerphi{N} = \frac{ed-1}{k}$ is an integer. Then we solve ~\ref{eq:wiener:pq} in $x$ in order to find $p, q$: \begin{align} \label{eq:wiener:pq} x^2 - (N - \eulerphi{N} + 1)x + N = 0 \end{align} The above equation is constructed so that the $x$ coefficient is the sum of the two primes, while the constant term $N$ is the product of the two. Therefore, if $\eulerphi{N}$ has been correctly guessed, the two roots will be $p$ and $q$. \section{An Implementation Perspective} The algorithm is pretty straightforward by itself: we just need to apply the definitions provided in ~\ref{eq:wiener:cf} and test each convergent until $\log N$ iterations have been reached. %% XXX. questo viene da 20 years, ma non e` spiegato perche`. A Continued fraction structure may look like this: \begin{minted}{c} typedef struct cf { bigfraction_t fs[3]; /* holding h_i/k_i, h_i-1/k_i-1, h_i-2/k_i-2 */ short i; /* cycling in range(0, 3) */ bigfraction_t x; /* pointer to the i-th fraction in fs */ BIGNUM* a; /* current a_i */ BN_CTX* ctx; } cf_t; \end{minted} where \texttt{bigfraction\_t} is just a pair of \texttt{BIGNUM} \!s $\angular{h_i, k_i}$. Whenever we need to produce a new convergent, we increment $i \pmod{3}$ and apply the given definitions. The fresh convergent must be tested with very simple algebraic operations. It is worth noting here that \ref{eq:wiener:pq} can be solved using the reduced discriminant formula, as $p, q$ are odd primes: \begin{align*} \Delta = \left( \frac{N-\eulerphi{N} + 1}{2} \right)^2 - N \\ x_{\angular{p , q}} = - \frac{N - \eulerphi{N} + 1}{2} \pm \sqrt{\Delta} \end{align*} Assuming the existence of the procedures \texttt{cf\_init}, initializing a continued fraction structure, and \texttt{cf\_next} producing the next convergent, we provide an algorithm for attacking the RSA cipher via Wiener: \begin{algorithm}[H] \caption{Wiener's Attack} \label{alg:wiener} \begin{algorithmic}[1] \Function{wiener}{\PKArg} \State $f \gets \texttt{cf\_init}(e, N)$ \For{$\ceil{\log N} \strong{ times }$} \State $k, d \gets \texttt{cf\_next}(f)$ \If{$k \nmid ed-1$} \strong{continue} \EndIf \State $\eulerphi{N} \gets (ed - 1)\ //\ k$ \If{$\eulerphi{N}$ is odd} \strong{continue} \EndIf %% XXX. it could be that calling 'b' b/2 and 'delta' sqrt(delta/4) is %% misleading. \State $b \gets (N - \eulerphi{N} + 1) \gg 1$ \State $\Delta, r \gets \dsqrt{b^2 - N}$ \If{$r \neq 0$} \strong{continue} \EndIf \State $p \gets b + \Delta$ \State $q \gets b - \Delta$ \State \strong{break} \EndFor \State \Return $p, q$ \EndFunction \end{algorithmic} \end{algorithm} \paragraph{Parallelism} Parallel implementation of this specific version of Wiener's Attack is difficult, because the inner loop is inherently serial. At best, parallelism could be employed to split the task into a \emph{constructor} process, building the $f_n$ convergents, and many \emph{consumers} receiving each convergent to be processed seperatedly. The first one arriving to a solution, broadcasts a stop message to the others. %%% Local Variables: %%% mode: latex %%% TeX-master: "question_authority" %%% End: